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The Next Decade in Latin America: Anticipating
the Future From the Past
by Robert J. Radway*
I. INTRODUCTION
A company planning an investment for expansion in a Latin Ameri-
can country today must evaluate more than just the local market condi-
tions ... It must also look at the implications of Latin America's evolu-
tion toward economic integration, in terms of expanded export
opportunities, growing import competition and the harmonized treat-
ment of foreign investment. However, the progress of integration in
Latin America has been slower than in Europe and the obstacles (natu-
ral, economic and political) are formidable. Moreover, setbacks in the
past years have delayed the implementation of harmonization rules.'
Largely due to the early efforts of development economists, most no-
tably Dr. Raul Prebisch, a new business climate has emerged in Latin
America, particularly during the 1970's. Regulation and control systems
have emerged which clearly bear the mark of Dr. Prebisch and like-
minded thinkers in singling out certain activities and sectors in the econ-
omy for attention.
Following his term as President of the Argentine Central Bank, Dr.
Prebisch became the first Executive Director of the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission of Latin America (ECLA), where he and the econo-
mists gathered around him, together with leading university professors
and high government officials, helped coordinate development planning
efforts with ECLA, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Many of the joint OAS/ECLA/
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IDB studies produced during the 1950's and subsequently were and still
are important in establishing or accomplishing development priorities and
goals. In 1964, Dr. Prebisch became the first Secretary-General of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and
his thinking subsequently influenced the rest of the Third World. Depen-
dency theory, which apparently arose from his work and that of his fol-
lowers, has become the most widely cited and discussed theory in the
background of today's development dialogue.
This article will review the economic strategies since World War II
and the formation of ECLA, the principle theories which have influenced
the development goals and priorities and given rise to these laws and reg-
ulations. Against this background, this article will address reappraisals in
development strategies which will affect the priorities and methodology
applied during the 1980's. Significant debate took place during the 11th
Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1980 to define
the "International Development Strategy" (IDS) for the Third Develop-
ment Decade. The proposal to formally initiate the "Global Negotiations"
was defeated. Although it would be foolish to predict specific develop-
ments or laws in a region as dynamic as Latin America, this article will
attempt to identify areas of public policy which the author believes will
be elevated to high priority during the 1980's and will therefore be regu-
lated more actively than in the past. Suggestions for the practitioner
about specific areas where laws are to be anticipated are included so that
clients can be counseled to plan accordingly.
II. EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA
A. Prelude
The 20th Century has seen a marked shift in Latin American eco-
nomic policy as a result of the breakdown in policies of economic liber-
alism adopted in the 19th Century in rejection of the mercantilistic poli-
cies followed by Spain during colonial times. In the early 19th Century,
laissez-faire economics had appeared attractive to the newly independent
colonies. It offered them expanded markets and permitted them to sell to
countries offering the best price, buy imports where they were cheapest,
and keep the profits themselves. The principle of the international divi-
sion of labor was compatible with the productive patterns already estab-
lished. Historically a supplier of food, agricultural and mineral raw
materials to Spain,2 Latin America found itself with the comparative ad-
vantage of maintaining this supply to the countries in Europe and North
' Spain's policy toward its colonies sought to integrate the colonial economies with its
own, to assure a steady or increased supply of primary commodities from the colonies while
promoting industrialization at home and deliberately ignoring it in the colonies.
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America which were undergoing rapid industrial expansion. According to
classical economic theory, countries producing raw materials had no need
to industrialize since they would reap their share of the benefits of techni-
cal progress through international exchange; efforts at industrialization
would only serve to lower their efficiency.
Latin America was not content to be bypassed by industrialization,
however, and sought to imitate the European model. At the end of the
19th Century, the region sought to develop its infrastructure (railroads,
telegraph communications, ports and public utilities) in an effort to pre-
pare for the diversification of production. When dealing in such general
terms, it is important not to overlook a key difference between European
and the Latin American social structures. When Latin America achieved
independence, political power remained in the hands of the landholding
class which represented only a small percentage of the population. While
landlords during colonial times were directly responsible for their serfs,
the combination of independence (making the workers free wage earners),
and economic and political liberalism simultaneously relieved them of the
responsibility for the welfare of their workers and permitted them to reap
the monetary gains of the open market. Infrastructural improvements
mainly served the landed proprietors as well as the foreign mining com-
panies and other investors whose capital had financed these improve-
ments. Proceeds from the sale of output were spent on imports from in-
dustrialized countries or, in the case of some mining companies, remained
abroad. Living standards of most of the population remained at or below
subsistence levels.
These conditions set off a chain reaction of revolt and reform which
spanned some 40 years and took various forms, beginning with the Mexi-
can Revolution of 1910 and the peaceful "policy revolution" in Uruguay
which began in 1904.8 It was the unstable years of the 1930's, however,
which saw a definite shift in policy trends in Latin America. The circle
had been completed-from colonial paternalism to the free market to
modern paternalism, in which the state assumes the responsibility for ec-
onomic recovery, progress and development.4
B. The Great Depression and World War II
The markets for primary products collapsed with the onset of the
Great Depression. As a result, most of the region's economies were virtu-
ally stranded because they depended almost totally upon the export earn-
ings their products brought. Only government intervention prevented
0 For a brief discussion of the Mexican and Uruguayan experiences, see, P. TRICHERT,
ECONOMIC POLICY REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 44-46 (1959).
1 Id. at 44, 47-48.
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complete economic collapse.
During World War I, due to the need to manufacture many consumer
items locally which could not be imported, the seeds were planted which
provided an added impetus to diversify production. World War II had a
similar effect on local manufacturing, but for some of the smaller repub-
lics in Latin America it took foreign assistance under the auspices of the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the U.S. Point Four Pro-
gram to institute a policy shift. As a result of the Great Depression, Latin
American economists learned that primary products were extremely vul-
nerable to cyclical price fluctuations, and this realization has shaped their
thinking ever since. The World Wars also illustrated the need to establish
some degree of import substitution. The combined experience led Latin
America away from desarrollo hacia afuera (an outward-oriented devel-
opment path), to desarrollo hacia adentro (an inward-looking develop-
ment path).5
C. ECLA and the Prebisch Era
At this point in time a new, coherent ideology and economic program
was advanced to explain the causes of the problems Latin America faced
and the proper course toward their resolution.
Significantly this ideology and programme came from the newly estab-
lished United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)
whose offices were opened in Santiago de Chile in 1948. It is significant
because the new ideology reflected more the frustrations of technocrats
and intellectuals than that of a newly emerging powerful social
class .... ECLA espoused an ideology for a class too weak to implement
it.. . . Divorced from contact with the mass of the Latin American poor
by his style of life, the international bureaucrat tends to look for com-
promises and for the lowest common denominator, thus not offending
anyone. Not surprisingly ECLA managed to avoid the realities of the
class struggle in Latin America and the role of the USA in that struggle.'
ECLA's perspective resulted from the belief that it was futile to ap-
ply conventional economic theory originating in developed capitalist
countries to the problems of developing countries. An appreciation for the
different historical situations and national contexts was required.
Dr. Raul Prebisch is credited for the main tenets of the ECLA's early
position. He argued that Latin America's underdevelopment was the re-
sult of its position in the world economy and its adoption of liberal capi-
talist economic policies. According to Prebisch, the terms of trade be-
O'Brien, A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency, in BEYOND THE SOCI-
OLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT 8 (I. Oxaal, T. Barnett & D. Booth, eds. 1975).
6 Id. at 9.
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tween the developed countries at the "center" and the underdeveloped
countries at the "periphery" were increasingly disadvantageous to the
latter. Over the long run, prices for primary products (Latin America's
"engine of growth") tend to decline while those of manufactured goods
remain stable or increase. This results in a chronic structural balance of
payments crisis. Productivity gains in the center lead to higher wages and
other factor prices. In the periphery however, they lead to a decline in
commodity prices and stagnant wages.'
The solution proposed was industrialization behind high protective
barriers which would assist "infant industries" and optimize allocation of
resources. Prebisch recognized that the State would have to manage the
industrialization drive particularly in terms of planning. The need to
achieve economies of scale prompted a recommendation to create a Latin
American Common Market. In these ways, Latin America would achieve
desarrollo hacia adentro. This strategy became known as "import substi-
tution industrialization" (ISI). It established industries which would sat-
isfy demand previously met by imports (accepting as given the existing
demand pattern), thereby improving the balance of payments.
Prebisch also believed that Latin America's economic difficulties
stemmed from domestic factors as well. Lack of capital, excessive concen-
tration of power in the hands of the wealthy, an inefficient system of land
tenure and inadequate domestic markets were cited. Prebisch's solution
included agrarian and tax reform, planning and domestic economic
restructuring.'
D. Economic Integration Movements and the Road to Development
1. The Latin American Free Trade Association
Although not the first of the Latin America economic integration
movements, the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), through the Treaty of Montevideo,' established free trade in
7 Id. at 9-10.
' Prebisch, Toward A Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America, in THE IDEOLO-
GIES OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS 368 (P. Sigmund ed. 1967). This was a refinement of ear-
lier thinking. See e.g., United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, The Eco-
nomic Development of Latin America And Its Principal Problems, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.12/
89/Rev. 1, (1950), in which is set forth Prebisch's theory of the Latin American periphery.
See also U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.12/680, at 71 (1963).
9 Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free
Trade Association, (Treaty of Montevideo) signed at Montevideo, Uruguay Feb. 18, 1960
[hereinafter cited as LAFTA], reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA
207 (1968) [hereinafter cited as IREILA].
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the combined territories of the contracting parties,10 which was to be
brought into full operation within 12 years of the date the Treaty entered
force. The LAFTA Treaty included a program for trade liberalization
through reduction of tariffs, the expansion and diversification of recipro-
cal trade, and the granting of "most favored nation" treatment to the
other contracting states for products and capital originating in or in-
tended for consignment to member states."1 The Treaty also incorporated
various escape provisions in the event of dumping or other unfair prac-
tices, established a preference for relatively less developed countries in
the group and included the customary privileges and immunities."s
Finally, reflecting both the preoccupation of the times and the reali-
ties of predominantly agricultural countries, the Treaty included special
provisions concerning agriculture which sought to harmonize the agricul-
tural development and commodity trade policies of the member states.1 s
These provisions included an objective to expand intra-LAFTA trade in
agricultural commodities."' This objective was to cover deficits in domes-
tic production of any member states, allowing priorities for products of
origin, but containing other protective provisions for those commodities
of substantial importance to the importing country's economy. Due to the
strong dependence of most of the member states on a few basic agricul-
tural commodities, these Treaty provisions created complicated issues.
Significantly, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was created
in 1960 to play a key role in the integration movement.'5
2. The Central American Common Market
A great deal of planning preceded the Treaty of Managua, or the
Central American Common Market (CACM) Treaty,' 6 which is generally
acknowledged as the base document for Central American economic inte-
gration. It was preceded in 1951 by the establishment of a Central Ameri-
can Economic Cooperation Committee and the establishment of the Or-
" The original signatories were Mexico and the South American countries of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Subsequently, ratifications were received from
Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia. See IREILA, supra note 9, at 221-22.
" See IREILA, supra note 9, chs. II, III & IV.
12 Id. chs. VI, VIII & X.
13 Id. ch. VII.
14 Id.
"' Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank (1960) [hereinafter
cited as IDB], reprinted in IREILA, supra note 9, at 341-64. See for example IDB Ear-
marks Agriculture and Energy as Key Lending Areas, Bus. LATIN AM, Apr. 16, 1980, at 121-
22.
1s General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, signed at Managua, Nica-
ragua, Dec. 13, 1960 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Managua], reprinted in IREILA, supra
note 9, at 23ff.
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ganization of Central American States (ODECA)' within the OAS." The
execution of a series of bilateral free trade treaties between the five mem-
ber countries occurred between 1951 and 1957, and the creation of key
technical institutions at that time was essential to the integration process.
In June of 1958, a multilateral treaty on free trade and Central American
integration, and an agreement for a regime for Central American inte-
grated industries were concluded."
Unlike the LAFTA Treaty, the CACM Treaty provided for immedi-
ate free trade in a number of important products which originated within
the region. It also included a list of protected products which were to be
progressively freed and special provisions for sensitive products which
had a significant impact on the economies of the member states. Nearly
50 percent of intra-regional trade was immediately freed in September of
1963 when Costa Rica ratified the Treaty thereby giving it effect.' 0 While
LAFTA foresaw only the free trade area, the CACM Treaty contemplated
a customs union with a common external tariff similar to the Rome
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC).2 1 The
Central American Bank for Economic Integration provided another im-
portant catalyst in this region."
3. The Latin American Common Market
At a 1967 Inter-American Summit Conference in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, the Presidents of 17 Latin American republics signed a declara-
tion proposing the creation of a Latin American Common Market over
the 15-year period between 1970 and 1985.2 In addition to the calls for
'1 Charter of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) signed at Panama
City, Panama, Dec. 12, 1962, reprinted in IREILA, supra note 9, at 199ff.
'8 Organization of American States (OAS) Charter, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
"g Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration,
signed at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, June 10, 1958, reprinted in IREILA, supra note 9, at 3ff.
Agreement on the System of Central American Integrated Industries, signed at Tegucigalpa,
Honduras, June 10, 1958, also reprinted in IREILA, at 89ff.
so For a comprehensive background discussion and the high hopes which greeted the
Central American integration process, see Simmonds, The Central American Common Mar-
ket: An Experiment in Regional Integration, 16 INT'L CoMp. L. Q. 911 (1967).
2' The treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as E.E.C. Treaty].
2' Agreement Establishing the Central American Bank for Economic Integration,
signed at Managua, Nicaragua, Dec. 13, 1960, see IREILA, supra note 9, at 143ff.
'" Declaration of the Presidents of America, translated in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 535
(1967). The complete text of the declaration is reproduced in IREILA, supra note 9, at
395ff. See also Simmonds, supra note 20, at 917. The 17 states present and signing included
Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, The Dominican Republic, and Panama, in addition to the
Members of the CACM and LAFTA groups, minus Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay.
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economic integration, goals included increased exports and foreign trade
earnings, stabilization of commodity prices, modernized and improved
living conditions for rural populations, higher levels of education, and
promotion of the application of science and technology for development.
The declaration of the Presidents defined the proposed Latin American
Common Market as a progressive convergence of the LAFTA and CACM
systems and took into account the interest of the Latin American coun-
tries not yet associated with either. The declaration was designed to en-
courage other countries of the region to enter into the system, and specifi-
cally included language calling for the conclusion of "temporary"
subregional agreements in an effort to further the declaration's objec-
tives.2 Two of these agreements were already in the formation process.
4. The Caribbean Integration Movement
The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was established
by an agreement in 1968.2" The four principal signatories were Barbados,
Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, all independent states at the
time the Treaty was created. The history of the integration movement
included the 1962 collapse of the West Indian Federation made up of for-
mer British Commonwealth territories, which subsequently formed the
West Indies Associated States in the Eastern Caribbean.26 The Caribbean
Development Bank was chartered and its relationship with the Inter-
American Development Bank continues to improve. They faced difficul-
ties such as the progressive decolonization of many members during this
same period. Many other complex problems contributed to a stalemate in
the free-trade area, which faded and re-emerged'in 1973 as the Caribbean
Common Market (CARICOM)2 7 Only now has this regional grouping be-
gun to prepare the studies and gather the concrete data necessary for the
leaders of these largely independent countries to balance the difficult is-
sues of sovereignty against economic viability, cooperation and market
" See Declaration of the Presidents of America, supra note 23, reprinted in IREILA,
supra note 9, at 395ff.
, Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association, signed at St. John's
Antigua, Apr. 30, 1968 [hereinafter cited as CARIFTA], reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 935 (1968).
16 For the statutory authorization for the creation of the Federation and for its Consti-
tution, see R. PREISWERK, DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN 285-
329 (1970). For a concise account of the factors contributing to the demise of the Federa-
tion, see Springer, Federation in the Caribbean: An Attempt That Failed, in THE AFTER-
MATH OF SOVEREIGNTY 189 (1973).
'7 The successor to CARIFTA, supra note 30, was the Treaty establishing the Carib-
bean Community, (Treaty of Chaguaramas) signed at Port of Spain, Trinidad, July 4, 1973
[hereinafter cited as CARICOM], reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1033 (1973).
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size."
5..The Andean Common Market
Formation of the subregional group by the Agreement of Cartagena-
is currently the most notorious effort toward integration. The Andean
Common Market (ANCOM) was an attempt by the middle income coun-
tries of LAFTA to improve their bargaining power vis-A-vis the "big
three" (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) who had gained a disproportionate
share of the initial benefits of LAFTA. The significant features of the
system include the customary efforts to liberalize trade (it has already
accomplished a number of tariff reductions internally, and a common ex-
ternal tariff, scheduled to be effected at the end of 1980, was again post-
poned), the establishment of sectoral programs for industrial develop-
ment, a uniform product classification like that of LAFTA, and other
measures designed to achieve standardization of economic policies. Pro-
posals for a double taxation agreement and the formation of Andean mul-
tinational enterprises were included. In 1979, an agreement was reached
to establish an Andean Tribunal, based in Quito, and an Andean Parlia-
ment in Bogota. s° Complications arose early in 1981 when Colombia
failed to ratify the Andean Court agreement. Uniform industrial property
rules have now been implemented in three of the five countries with a
fourth expected in the near future, and other economic harmonization is
anticipated. The establishment of the Andean Development Corporation
was a significant forerunner to the launching of this subregional group.
Decision 24,s" the code for foreign investment and technology, is the most
widely discussed and controversial feature of this subregional group. De-
cision 24 contained familiar restrictions on foreign investment, transfer of
technology, local borrowings, and the novel divestiture or "fade out" pro-
" Caribbean Group Recommends Measures To Promote Business, Bus. LATIN AM.,
Aug. 6, 1980, at 255-56.
" Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, (Agreement of Cartagena) signed
May 26, 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, effective Oct. 16, 1969 [herein-
after cited as ANCOM]. Translated in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910 (1969). In 1973,
through the Consensus of Lima, Feb. 13, 1973, Venezuela's entry was approved, see 12 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 344 (1973); and 15 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N 398 (1974). See also
Radway, Venezuela: Certain Legal Considerations for Doing Business, 8 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 289, 290-92 (1976). Chile has subsequently withdrawn from ANCOM through Addi-
tional Protocol dated Oct. 5, 1976, see Chile Walks Out as Andean Talks Collapse [1977]
LATIN AM. ECON. REP. 145.
SO BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 6.
3' Common Regime for Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Li-
censes and Royalties, Decision 24 of the Commission of the Agreement of Cartagena (An-
dean Pact), Dec. 31, 1970, 4 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N 72 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Decision 24].
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visions, as well as other restrictions.32 Political cooperation among these
five countries was evident on several occasions in 1979 and 1980, but a
series of political and economic problems reversed this progress. In 1981,
local newspapers in several ANCOM countries carried obituary notices
for the experiment.
6. The New Latin American Integration Agreement
As a result of an agreement at Acapulco, Mexico in late June of 1980,
the Latin American Association for Integration (LAIA)s3 has replaced
LAFTA. It is speculated that this new agreement will reveal methods for
integration which reflect the changes wrought upon Latin American socie-
ties by fundamental changes in the emerging world economy, most nota-
bly the world-wide energy situation. This effort is only one in a series of
modifications designed to continuously adapt integration and develop-
ment plans to the realities of the hemisphere. The role of the multina-
tional corporations in economic integration in Latin America has finally
been accepted,8 ' after some stormy years of confrontation. Trade patterns
have been established in the last two decades among the continental
countries in Latin America and signs of the same can be seen between the
mainland and several Caribbean countries. The agreements have received
endorsement under the name of "commercial accords," which, along with
other "partial agreements," appear to have replaced the system of na-
tional list concessions which spelled disaster for LAFTA when the risk-
free items were exhausted.85 A new emphasis has been placed on bilateral
agreements as a category of commercial accords. Facing a stormy future,
ANCOM may subrogate subregionalism in favor of bilateralism as an in-
termediate path to integration.
E. Common, Larger Markets for Increased Production and Efficiency
1. Internal and External Tariffs
Dr. Prebisch and the ECLA theorists reasoned correctly: in order to
" All references to Decision 24 also include the modifications contained in Decisions 37,
37a, 70, 103 and 109. See Radway, supra note 29, at 295-304. Decision 103 modified Art. 37,
revising profit remittances and reinvestment limits; see 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 138
(1977).
33 Agreement creating the Latin American Integration Association, signed at Acapulco,
Mexico, June 27, 1980 [hereinafter cited as LAIA].
, See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the Round-
table on the Role of Transnational Enterprises in the Latin American Integration Process,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.7/29 (1979).
.. New Integration Treaty Revises Ground Rules and Dismantles LAFTA, Bus. LATIN
AM., July 9, 1980, at 217-18.
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move the economies of the Latin American countries away from depen-
dence on primary commodities, there was a need for rationalization of
production and distribution in these countries. The economic integration
movements were adopted as a means of increasing the size of the relevant
market, thereby attracting capital and technology to produce semi-manu-
factured products on a scale which would be efficient and economical. To
do this, technocrats identified the tariff structures existing among the
Latin American countries and negotiated to reduce tariff barriers and fa-
cilitate a freer flow of goods among the member states. In reality, the
LAFTA negotiations broke down after the relatively insignificant national
list items were negotiated (and tariffs correspondingly reduced) when
they faced the items which had an impact on domestic producers.
The single most important result of the LAFTA negotiations was the
execution of 25 complementation agreements." These accords were
reached by two, three or sometimes four countries (frequently Mexico
and the Southern Cone countries) within a specific industry, and only
bind and benefit the signatories. The negotiations primarily concerned
those industries affected by a relatively limited number of very sophisti-
cated multinational enterprises (e.g. chemicals, electrical and electronic
products, office products, computers and photographic equipment). These
agreements are effectively concluded through the industry associations
(chambers) of the respective countries in which the local subsidiaries of
those multinationals are active and important. This self-serving activity
benefits host countries by creating new trade patterns among these coun-
tries, in addition to increasing the sales of those multinationals which are
most active in the market. If economic integration is going to be success-
ful, trade patterns must multiply among these countries where little ex-
isted prior to the Montevideo Treaty."'
Beyond the reduction of internal tariffs, the goal was to establish a
common external tariff so products originating outside the region would
be discriminated against, thereby providing an incentive for internal
manufacturing. The member states also wanted to keep all countries on
an equal footing by avoiding harmful competition among themselves for
importation of a finished product or its critical assemblies or components.
2. Rationalization of Production
As mentioned earlier, part of the Central American scheme was the
Agreement on the System of Central American Integrated Industries,
See Summary of LAFTA's Approved Complementation Agreements, Bus. LATIN
Am., Mar. 19, 1980, at 92-93.
37 See Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 9.
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signed in 1958.8 This program's purpose was to provide incentives, bene-
fits and guarantees for industries to be established in one country within
the subregion, in order to serve the entire area with modern and efficient
methods of production and improve the standard of living of the people.
Among the benefits were duty exemptions, tax exemptions and reductions
(including income tax exemptions if the entity qualified) and an agree-
ment by the member states that none would grant federal fiscal incen-
tives which might distort the effects of this elaborate scheme. These in-
dustries had to make feasibility studies, meet standards of quality and a
host of other detailed procedures and controls. If it had worked, sole pro-
ducers would have served the five-member CACM and gained the advan-
tages of economies of scale.
Decision 25 was the Andean Common Market plan for sectoral pro-
grams of industrial development.89 This appeared to be patterned after
the earlier Central American experiment, gaining valuable experience
from its successes and failures in allocating production among the mem-
ber states within the industry being negotiated. Thus, the market for the
member nations would be identified and production allocated to take ad-
vantage of economies of scale while taking precautions not to allocate
more than an efficient number of plants for any given product. In some
cases one plant might suffice to produce products for the entire subregion,
or if the subregional market would support more, two countries might
receive an allocation. Decision 57 (now replaced by Decision 146) ap-
proved the Metalworking sectorial,40 Decision 91 approved the Pe-
trochemical,'4 1 and Decision 120 approved the Automotive program.43 At
this writing, Fertilizer and Steel agreements are at the advanced stages of
negotiations and others are well along.
In addition to rivalries and political competition among members,
the problems with both the Central American and ANCOM production
rationalization schemes involve the geographic, topographic and other
characteristics of the countries and markets themselves. Although the
Central American group is compact and small, the Andean group offers a
drastic contrast. At the present time it is physically impossible to ship
3' See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
39 Decision 25 of Dec. 14, 1970, see Furnish & Atkin, Andean Group's Program for
Industrial Development of the Metalworking Sector: Integration with Due and Deliberate
SPID, 7 LAw AM. 61 (1975).
40 Decision 57 of Aug. 20, 1972. For Spanish text, see 16 GRuPo ANDINO 19 Annex
(1972). Decision 57 was modified by Decision 57a of Sept. 4-9, 1972. See also Furnish &
Atkin, supra note 39. ANCOM Decision 146 was approved at the XXVII Period of Regular
Sessions of the Commission, July 16-23, 1979, Lima, Peru.
" Decision 91 of Aug. 29, 1975. For Spanish text, see 48 GRuPo ANDINO. 1 Annex (1975).
Translated in 2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 98 (1977).
'" Decision 120 of Sept. 13, 1977.
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goods from the Caribbean coast of Colombia through to Bolivia by land.
In fact, most shipments must reach Bolivia from the Southern Cone
countries, with which Bolivia shares much more than it shares with the
northern Andean countries.'8 Communications and all forms of transpor-
tation are extremely difficult in this mountainous terrain. When this di-
lemma is coupled with the traditional problems of population growth,
large unexplored or uncultivated territories, largely unsuccessful experi-
ments with land reform and the near disastrous effect of ISI discussed
earlier, it suggests that true integration of the Andean subregion is a for-
midable task, if possible at all with current thinking.
The Central American group has been literally torn wide open by
war, insurrection, revolution and guerrilla warfare. While violence has
been no stranger to Guatemala and other areas in the region over at least
the last three decades, the violent revolution in Nicaragua and persisting
civil war in El Salvador suggest that integration of this subregion also
faces formidable barriers.
III. THE 1960'S AND 1970's: NATIONALISM AND CONTROL FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION
A. Dependency Theory and Development
By the 1960's, it became apparent that import substitution industri-
alization (ISI) had been carried out indiscriminately by across-the-board
promotion of industries, often without regard to potential comparative
advantage. Inefficient and high-cost industries emerged as a result of
small markets, limited capital, and lack of skilled manpower.
The situation becomes especially pronounced in industries having high
fixed costs. These industries require large-scale output in order to bring
costs down to levels prevailing in more advanced countries. Outstanding
examples of these are the steel and automobile industries which have
been established in most of the larger Latin American countries. In the
case of automobiles, the situation was worsened because a large number
of these countries permitted the establishment of many firms, thus com-
pletely eliminating the possibilities of economies of large scale
Thus, it should come as no surprise that allegations during the July 1980 Bolivian
military coup ran to the effect that the Argentine military provided considerable assistance
to their Bolivian counterparts. Allegations were also made that the Brazilian and Chilean
militaries provided similar assistance. One need only know the history of the Southern Cone
countries to appreciate these allegations. In fact, one could also infer that Bolivia's reluc-
tance to fully implement certain laws and regulations of the Andean Pact may increase and,
if not leading to a Chilean-type separation, then conceivably Bolivia could be foreseen to
pay "benign neglect" to the restrictive aspects (particularly with respect to foreign invest-
ment and technology) of the subregional integration efforts, and follow the model of its
friendly Southern Cone neighbors.
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production.4'
The high tariffs, imposed in order to protect "infant industries," re-
duced the incentive to increase efficiency. Credit resources allocated to
new industries meant that fewer resources were available to agriculture.
Export of traditional goods was neglected, while the composition of im-
ports changed to reflect the need for raw materials and for semi-finished
and capital goods to support the new industries. The rate of productivity
increased. Labor absorption in industry lagged badly behind the rate of
growth of the urban population; and because some countries had adopted
labor legislation in the 1930's and 1940's which raised the level of wages
in industry (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Chile), no incentives remained to
adopt labor-intensive techniques. Other serious economic problems in-
cluded excess concentration of income (the growth of demand was insuffi-
cient to maintain initial ISI momentum), excess capacity (the very nature
of the industries forced building substantially ahead of demand), the neg-
lect of agriculture and other sectors (the artificial allocation of resources
created severe bottlenecks), and regional concentration of industry and
income (a problem which still faces Mexico, Brazil and Argentina)."' In
short, the problems that the ISI strategy was designed to eliminate still
remained or continued to worsen, and others unforeseen were added. It
was not until the integrated industrial schemes in the late 1960's that any
attempt was made to at least promote ISI on a regional basis. Thus, ISI
strategy as carried out in Latin America did not promote self-sufficiency
and development. Instead, another form of dependency resulted, related
to the technology, know-how, and capital possessed by the multinational
corporations. In an attempt to explain the failure of ISI, the theory of
dependency emerged."'
While there were a number of different traditions within the theory
of dependency, 47 all shared one basic hypothesis. The theory was that de-
velopment and underdevelopment coexisted within the world economy as
a result of the normal functioning of the total capitalist system. Un-
derdevelopment was not merely a different stage of a productive system
but rather a position, serving a function within an international system of
" Baer, Critics of Latin American Import Substitution, in LEADING ISSUES IN ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT (G. Meier ed. 1976), at 742.
" Id. at 746-47.
46 See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 7.
"' O'Brien categorizes some of the authors subsequent to Prebisch as following the
ECLA structuralist perspective (e.g., Osval Do Sunkel, Celso Furtado), a Marxist perspec-
tive (e.g., Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, A.G. Frank) and straddling both of the
above (e.g., Anibal Quijano, Fernando Cardoso, Octavio Ianni, Florenstan Fernandes). "The
differences between these groups," stated O'Brien, "is clearest when it comes to perspectives
for political action." Id. at 11.
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production and distribution. Those with an autonomous capacity for
change and growth became the developed sector and those who lacked
this capacity were dependent upon that sector.4 Marxist writers on impe-
rialism have traditionally emphasized that underdevelopment can only be
understood as part of the world capitalist system. What emerged was the
attempt to develop laws of motion governing the dependent economies
based on an understanding of the world economic structure. 9
Dependency theorists distinguished three historical periods when an-
alyzing the nature and impact of foreign ties:
1) the colonial era, when dependence was tied to absolute colonial control
of trade and production patterns;
2) the desarrollo hacia afuera period, when development took on a for-
eign orientation, as dictated by participation in the free market and for-
eign investment concentration in production of raw materials and agri-
cultural products for consumption in the developed countries;
3) the post-World War II period, when dependence stemmed from in-
vestments by multinational corporations in industries geared to the in-
ternal markets of developing countries. This dependence resulted from
the control multinationals possessed over commercial technology, and
the related tendency for local industrialists to link with the multination-
als in order to have access to modern technology. 0
In contrast to previous forms of dependency where trade was perhaps the
predominant factor, the internal markets of the developing countries now
assume special strategic significance.
B. Regulation and Control
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the Latin Americans, along with
other Third World countries, began to assert their desire for effective
control over natural resources and increasing control over economic activ-
ities.5 1 This assertion was the direct result of the development objectives
they sought to accomplish and the application of the dependency theory.
1. Natural Resources (Extractive Industry)
A new wave of expropriations designed to break the links of depen-
40 Id. at 12-13.
19 Id. at 13.
50 Id. at 15. See also Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, in THE POLMCAL
ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 110-11 (C. Wilber ed. 1973).
" See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 21, G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See also Brower & Tepe, The Char-
ter of Economic Rights of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L
LAW. 306 (1975).
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dency by asserting sovereignty over natural resources swept Latin
America in the 1960's and continued into the 1970's. This was preceded
by the expropriation of oil properties by the Republic of Mexico under
President Lazaro Cardenas in 1938, the nationalization of the tin mines in
Bolivia during the 1952 revolution, and others.52 In the 1960's, however,
the instances of expropriation became more widespread. Beginning with
the gradualism reflected in the "Chileanization" imposed by the Frei Ad-
ministration and the expropriations of the International Petroleum Com-
pany in Peru, and continuing through a steady stream of "nationaliza-
tions," most of the nations in the hemisphere began to assert effective
control over their own natural resources.' 8 Many nationalizations were ac-
companied by harsh anti-foreign attitudes which were manifested in a
disbelief or disregard of the assertions made by the multinationals in the
extractive industries of the need for an adequate rate of return on the
enormous investments and high risks involved in bringing the natural re-
sources into production.
2. Infrastructure
Vital to the' development of the nationalized extractive industries
and deemed to be strategic, infrastructure was nationalized as a first step
in asserting control over economic activities. Therefore, such industries as
electric power, communications, railroads and trucking were nationalized
during this same period." Airlines and shipping companies were also na-
tionalized to some extent," although several countries continued to main-
tain at least one private airline and/or shipping line.
It is well known that many of these key infrastructure industries
have been inefficient in the larger Latin American countries following na-
tionalization. This inefficiency, in addition to the deregulation trends now
prevalent in the United States, may cause the technocrats of Latin
America to re-evaluate the policy of nationalization, and to more actively
discuss the possibilities of partial deregulation and reprivatization in se-
lected areas during the 1980's and beyond. (This is already happening in
Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Brazil.)
" There were earlier expropriations in Mexico, the Central and South American coun-
tries and, of course, Cuba. For a colorful account, see Eder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper
and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAW. 611 (1970); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964); see also EXPROPRIATION IN THE.AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY (A. Lowenfeld
ed., 1971).
" See generally Eder, supra note 52.
5' This was also literally preceded by expropriation of subsidiaries of American & For-
eign Power Co. in Argentina in the 1940's and 1950's, and others scattered throughout the
hemisphere. See Eder, supra note 52, at 612-13.
50 Id.
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3. Banking and Finance
Mobilization of domestic and external sources of capital at unparal-
leled rates had to be accomplished to support the development goals."
One of the significant achievements during the 1960's and 1970's in bank-
ing and finance was the introduction and development of the important
role played by non-banking financial institutions. The Nacional Financi-
era S.A. of Mexico is a pioneer among such institutions in the hemi-
sphere. 7 The objective of these newly created institutions was to contrib-
ute to capital formation. Their introduction provided additional means of
mobilizing savings and investment funds for industrial or housing
activities.
Another major breakthrough occurred in Brazil, where financial ex-
perts devised a system of indexing an employee's wages, pensions, social
security funds, fringe benefits, savings accounts and a number of other
assets according to a "monetary correction" factor which was based upon
some very complicated indices. One of the ideas was to adjust for the
differences between imported and domestic inflation in order to maintain
export competitiveness because the cruzeiro, like most of the other cur-
rencies in Latin America, is closely tied to the U.S. dollar. In recent years,
other Latin American countries have adopted variations of the Brazilian
indexation and monetary correction formulas, but none have devised as
complicated a system as that of Brazil.
In addition, restrictions and limitations were placed on foreign banks
beginning with the nationalization of foreign banks in Chile under the
Allende government. The Andean Pact rules (Decision 24) called for di-
vestiture of the majority equity position held by foreign banks. This has
been diligently administered in Venezuela and Colombia. Foreign banks
also reduced their position substantially in Peru during the Velasco Ad-
ministration in the 1970's, and in isolated cases in Argentina during the
Per6n Administration.
Domestic investors began to turn their attention to the capital mar-
kets of several of the Latin American countries. Although stock exchanges
in Latin America were not a new phenomenon (the Bolsa de Comercio de
Buenos Aires dates back to 1854 with earlier roots in a mercantile ex-
change established in 1822; the Bolsa de Valores de Mexico dates back to
1894),11 this period saw the groundwork being laid for a deepening and
U.S. Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon cited the need for $20 billion of new for-
eign capital for the decade of the 1960's. See W. ROGERS, THE TWILIGHT STRUGGLE: THE
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND POLrnCS OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 37 (1967).
'7 For a detailed study of the risk-reducing role of Nacional Financiera, S.A., and other
development banks, see Anderson, Bankers as Revolutionaries, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF MEXICO 105-91 (W. Glade Jr. & C. Anderson eds. 1963).
" See D. EITEMAN, STOCK EXCHANGES IN LATIN AMERICA 14 (1966).
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broadening of the capital markets. But such development was badly hurt
by some very severe speculation in recent years which wreaked havoc on
several of the financial markets, particularly in the Rio de Janeiro and
Sao Paulo stock exchanges. The more sophisticated structures and con-
trols to reduce the possibilities of recurring damage are only now begin-
ning to emerge.
4. Foreign Investment
Capital formation, or the conversion of savings to investment in
classical economics, is the underpinning of industrialization. In order to
implement these development strategies, it was necessary to identify and
mobilize capital flows, including both debt and equity capital. Con-
founding these efforts were exchange rate fluctuations, a serious problem
in virtually every country in the region. In addition to the unstable com-
modity prices, exchange rate fluctuations were the result of a complex
interaction of domestic and international factors which have been treated
elsewhere and are outside the scope of this article. In attempting to regu-
late and control these fluctuations, laws were introduced in Brazil in
1962'9 and in Colombia in 196760 to regulate foreign investment (both
loans and equity capital) and the flow of foreign technology into the
countries. This phenomenon was duplicated in the Andean Common
Market (Decision 24), 61 Argentina s and Mexico 63 in the early 1970's."
One way the foreign investment laws enacted during this era at-
tempted to limit the outflow of foreign exchange was by limiting the per-
centage of profit which could be remitted to a stated percentage of the
registered capital base. Determining what planners believed was a "rea-
sonable" return on investment was another example of State interven-
' Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, as amended by Law No. 4.390 of Aug. 20, 1964, and
Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, [1965] 20 Coletanea 1500 (Braz.), reprinted in Banco
Central do Brasil, Foreign Investment in Brazil, LEGISLATION, Jan., 1977, at 19.
" Decree-Law No. 444 of Mar. 22, 1967, [1967] (Colomb.), reprinted in 30 LEGISLACI6N
ECON6MICA 191 (1967).
1 Decision 24, supra note 31.
62 Argentine Foreign Investment Law, Law No. 21.382 of Aug. 28, 1976, [1976] Boletin
Oficial [B.O.], (Arg.), reprinted in Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina, [1976] C. Anales 2071;
and 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1364 (1976). For a discussion of the 1976 Law, see McKinnis,
The Argentine Foreign Investment Law of 1976, 17 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357 (1978).
" Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment, [1973]
Diario Oficial [D.O.1, Mar. 9, 1973 (Mex.), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 643
(1973). See also Radway, Doing Business in Mexico: A Practical Legal Analysis, 14 INT'L
LAW. 363 (1980).
", "The drastic deterioration of U.S.-Latin American economic relations since 1969 is
reflected in the foreign investment restrictions enacted during that period." See Schliesser,
Recent Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment Laws, 6 INT'L LAW. 64 (1972).
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tion.. The percentage permissible for dividend remittances varies from 12
percent in Argentina and Brazil to 20 percent, the limit now permitted in
the Andean Pact countries;"" however, Mexico has no such ceiling.
In the majority of countries where dividend remittances are limited
to a percentage of registered capital, an additional percentage may be re-
invested without prior approval. Here the countries differ. The Andean
Pact countries initially permitted reinvestment of only 5 percent. In 1976,
after Chile had withdrawn" (partly because of overly restrictive invest-
ment laws), the reinvestment limit was raised to 7 percent. Brazil, Mex-
ico, Argentina and Chile have no limitation on reinvestment. In those
countries in the Andean group which strictly enforced the 7 percent rein-
vestment limitation (Venezuela and Colombia being the principal ones),
surplus funds were generated which could neither be remitted as divi-
dends nor reinvested to add to the capital base and were therefore re-
ferred to as "limbo money." These funds are outside the system of con-
trolled capital in those countries, and although they may be lent
indirectly to be used as working capital, they are not available for capital
formation. The rationale behind continuing this restriction escapes many
observers. In December of 1978, Colombia modified its rule on reinvest-
ment, permitting up to 50 percent of the earned surplus after dividends
to be reinvested under certain conditions, including the mandate that the
other 50 percent be used to buy government development bonds. In
September of 1980, Venezuela issued a resolution with a similar effect.e8
As governments changed in Chile and Argentina during the 1970's
different assumptions with respect to development strategy were intro-
duced. Certain restrictions on foreign investment were eased. Chile has
become the most liberal country in the hemisphere with respect to foreign
investment restrictions. Argentina generally follows close behind. Argen-
tina introduced additional modifications in early 1980"1 to further loosen
the restrictions on foreign investment, and, in early 1981, introduced even
more in the technology area.70 Mexico also introduced greater flexibility
in mid-1978, and Brazil's ability to modify credit, investment and ex-
change control rules varies dramatically with its balance of payments sta-
65 See BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 10.
" See Chile, Walks Out as Andean Talks Collapse, supra note 29.
67 See Resolution 29 of 1978 of the National Council of Economic and Social Policy
(division of the National Planning Department), 53 LEGISLACI6N ECON6MIcA 348 (1979), re-
printed in Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n, Foreign Investment in Colombia, BAsic
RULES, June 1980, at 59-60.
68 Ministry of Finance Resolution 324 of Sept. 11, 1980, [1980] G.O. 32.067, Sept. 12,
1980 (Ven.).
"o See Law No. 22.208 of Apr. 8, 1980, [1980] (Arg.), reprinted in Boletin Semanal del
Ministerio de Economla, No. 354 (Sept. 8, 1980).
70 Law 22.426 of March 12, 1981.
1981
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tus. Since the sharp increases in oil prices in 1974, Brazil has had to im-
pose substantially greater restrictions on capital flows, particularly
foreign loans, than existed during the "miracle" years of 1964-74. While it
may not be possible to predict what will happen in Brazil, it is clear that
foreign investment is encouraged, in an effort to move away from depen-
dence on imported oil and to develop the agricultural sector.
Until recently, Colombia and Venezuela had the most restrictions on
foreign investment within the Andean group. During that period foreign
investment fell off dramatically in Venezuela and was maintained at a
modest level in Colombia. It had virtually dried up in Peru since the ex-
propriations and the stifling stance of the Velasco government in the
early 1970's, until significant improvements in the economy and govern-
ment policy in late 1978 and 1979 provided the atmosphere for change.
The Colombians have been reviewing their policy on foreign investment
since early 1979. The results have yet to be announced but subtle im-
provements easing restrictions have been observed. In 1980, Venezuela
announced a liberalization in its foreign investment policy and the long-
overdue appointment of an acting Superintendent of Foreign Investment
within the Ministry of Finance to devote full time to that important
agency. 71
5. Technology-Its Development and Transfer
Shortly after the convening of the first United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964,' the important role of
technology in the development process began to receive universal ac-
knowledgement. Studies were conducted within UNCTAD, by ECLA and
by individual countries which produced the beginning of a steady stream
of information on technology. These early studies emphasized two meth-
ods of technology transfer: the license agreement and the technical assis-
tance agreement between a foreign parent and its locally owned subsidi-
ary (usually 100 percent owned at that time).78 One of the conclusions
drawn from the early studies was that these agreements were used often
by the multinationals to drain those countries of additional profits which
they could not remit through the normal, central bank-controlled ex-
change route. Instances were identified where abuses had been commit-
ted. Generalizations were made, and a series of laws were enacted in an
effort to regulate this vital element of development. The evolution of and
7 See for example Mann, Venezuela Woos Investors N.Y. Times, July 15, 1980.
11 UNCTAD was established as a permanent organ of the United Nations General As-
sembly on Dec. 30, 1964, G.A. Res. 1965, 19 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 1 U.N. Doc. A/5815
(1965).
" See Radway, Transfer of Technology to Colombia: A Proposal to Modify Decision
24, 12 LAw AM. 321 (1980).
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various approaches to the technology transfer laws in the different coun-
tries have been described elsewhere."' One look at a list of some of the
principal laws enacted in the course of the 1970's to regulate and control
technology is staggering."5
The technology laws are, however, another example of the belief that
government must intervene on the side of its productive sector in order
for the development strategy to be implemented. The dependency argu-
ment was used extensively and is called upon to justify these laws to this
day. Another often repeated argument calls upon the necessity to increase
the bargaining position and skills of those negotiating for the host coun-
try enterprise, be it public or private. If the truth be known, rarely were
the intelligence and skills of the negotiators for the host country cause for
inappropriate decisions being made. In reality,, the more logical, technical
judgment and experience of the officials in the user organization were fre-
quently overruled or interfered with by political constraints and the poor
judgments of others.
This is not to suggest that no abuses were committed. It is now ad-
mitted that abuses occurred, but it is also widely believed that most of
them have been corrected. In addition, many of the governments have
produced statistics showing that they have reduced by hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars the outflow of foreign exchange for technology payments.
Brazil has used technology as a "whipping boy" and has released statis-
tics showing that payments for foreign technology constitute the second
largest outflow of its precious foreign exchange. These figures clearly in-
clude all capital equipment and hardware, including the nuclear hardware
acquired from West Germany for its alternate energy program. Simulta-
neously, however, Brazil has embarked upon a most impressive technol-
ogy development, program in seven major centers throughout the country.
Mexico. has: also pursued a highly sophisticated program to develop and
adapt technology more suitable to its internal needs. Presently, it is esti-
mated that Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and
Chile are exporting technology which was developed in those countries.
As they further develop and export technology, the concept of reciprocity
may affect the restrictive terms, of regulation which they apply to im-
ported technology.
6. Industries Reserved for State or National Companies
Latin American governments have expressed the desire to limit the
influence of foreign cultures. The effect of "conspicuous consumption" in
See for example Radway, Comparative Evolution of Technology Transfer Policies in
Latin America: The Practical Realities, 9 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197 (1980).
" Id. at 204-06.
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particular was viewed as a detrimental influence upon these developing
nations. As a result, the governments have reserved certain "influence-
oriented" industries, such as advertising, broadcasting and publishing, for
national corporations. This rationale, coupled with the need to develop
local skills, has led to the reservation of the "internal commercialization"
sector for nationals. Venezuela appears to have enforced this restrictions
much more zealously than other ANCOM countries. The exclusion of for-
eign equity participation in infrastructure industries has been justified on
"public interest" grounds,7 while the national control of basic industries
has been justified on "national security" grounds." It seems likely that
the equity composition (parastatal, national and foreign ownership) in
these countries will be modified as economies mature and become more
diverse. The pressures of the past three decades will make way for other
needs, such as increased productivity and competitive exports.
7. Industries Singled Out for Special Attention: Pharmaceutical and
Automotive
The pharmaceutical industry and the automotive industry in Latin
America exemplify a trend of increasing governmental intervention. The
pharmaceutical industry has been under serious attack throughout Latin
America and other Third World countries for many years. Reasons of-
fered for this treatment include high profits and technology transfer. The
high visibility of production and distribution of ethical and over-the-
counter drugs and the direct effect on national health and welfare evoke
considerable emotionalism. These factors were cited as justifications for
intervention and increased regulation of foreign pharmaceutical
companies.
Recently the States went further. Studies revealed that large num-
bers of pharmaceutical patents had not been exploited. The States' role
was originally limited to the distribution of generic products to State en-
terprises. As predicted by foreign pharmaceutical companies, however,
the role has expanded in at least Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador to include
manufacture as well as distribution. The industrial property laws of Mex-
ico0 7 and Decision 85 of the ANCOM countries 79 categorize many phar-
7' See e.g. sources cited in note 62 supra.
17 See e.g. Argentine Decree No. 283/77, [1977] B.O., Feb. 10, 1977, (Arg.), reprinted in
[1977] A. Anales 303; and 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 660 (1977). See also McKinnis, supra
note 62.
78 See Mexican Law on Inventions and Trademarks, [1976] D.O., Feb. 10, 1976 (Mex.).
See also Hyde and de Ia Corte, Mexico's 1976 Law of Inventions and Trademarks 12 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469 (1980), at 471.
71 Regulations for the Application of the Norms on Industrial Property, Decision 85, 28
GRUPO ANDINO 11, (1974), translated in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1489 (1974); enacted in
Vol. 13:3
ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE
maceutical products, compounds, and processes as "unpatentable." Such
regulation and intervention in this industry is expected to increase.
The automotive industry is also the subject of governmental scrutiny
in Latin America. The industry acts as the hub of industrialized econo-
mies and encourages the development of supplier infrastructures in each
country through "multiplier" effects. Individual countries have instituted
control over the automotive industry with varying degrees of success.
In Mexico, this treatment amounted to "Mexicanization." The gov-
ernment has required a progressive increase in local industry ownership
and national content incorporated into the final vehicle. Foreign partici-
pation in the auto parts industry was limited to 40 percent and theoreti-
cally to 49 percent in the assembly industry. 0 In return for commitments
to the creation of new jobs, regional deconcentration and export quotas,
however, the foreign automotive companies remain wholly owned in
Mexico.
On the other hand, the automotive industry in Argentina has been a
classic example of protectionism and inefficiency. Until a few years ago,
11 foreign automotive companies participated in a market which pro-
duced 225,000 vehicles annually, while it is generally understood that the
break-even point for one producer is 250,000 units in these international
markets. The result was not difficult to predict. Foreign auto manufactur-
ers were discouraged by inadequate investment returns and the increase
of anti-multinational feelings during the second Per6n Administration.
General Motors led the disengagement of foreign manufacturers. Only
four foreign auto manufacturers remain in Argentina with the recent
merger between the Argentine subsidiaries of Peugeot and Fiat and Volk-
swagen's purchase of Chrysler's interests.6 1
Decision 120 established an automotive sectorial allocation plan in
the Andean Common Market."6 This plan allocated production of various
models to each of the five member countries and included some novel
"co-production" agreements, notably between Ecuador and Venezuela.
Duplication was theoretically kept to an absolute minimum. Recent crit-
ics of this plan have pointed out that it was originally submitted to the
Junta prior to 1974 and that designs have not been modified to account
for oil price increases.66 Substantially higher energy prices and very small
Ecuador by Decree No. 1257 publishes Mar. 28, 1977, [1977] 304 Registro Oficial [R.O.1
(Ecu.); in Colombia by Decree 1190, June 26, 1978; in Peru by Decree-Law No. 225.32,
(1979] (Peru) EL PERUANO, May 17, 1979.
80 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment, supra
note 63.
N' Argentine Auto Imports Fail to Displace Local Car Producers, Bus. LATIN AM., Mar.
5, 1980, at 80.
82 Decision 120 of the Andean Common Market, Quito, Sept. 1977.
3 For a detailed study, see Gwynne, The Andean Group Automobile Program; An In-
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markets suggest that this plan may run into serious problems.
Auto manufacturers in Brazil have apparently met with great success
in the substantial Brazilian markets despite restrictive "regulations"
which are often unwritten. Part of this success, however, results from the
exportation of models and assemblies manufactured there.
Some of these government actions are manifestations of increased
nationalism, justified in a variety of ways in different industries and dif-
ferent countries. Others are clear assertions of increased self-determina-
tion and reduced dependency on external capital, technology and centers
of decision-making.
IV. REAPPRAISAL OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES AND STRATEGY
Although improvements were shown in many sectors and in several
countries, deadline after deadline was missed, postponed or completely
renegotiated. Development has not progressed in Latin America as Dr.
Prebisch and his followers had hoped. Record high population increases
throughout the 1950's, 1960's, and much of the 1970's diluted the total
growth in most countries, causing per capital growth to fall below pro-
jected targets. The gaps between the rich and the poor increased rather
than decreased, and poverty was not eliminated. Although substantial
progress was made in building institutions for future growth and develop-
ment, many problems still existed. There remained an overdependence on
a few primary commodities subject to fluctuating prices. Corresponding
fluctuations in foreign exchange rendered adequate planning for borrow-
ing and growth virtually impossible. Unfavorable terms of trade, although
improved in many ways, still prevented Latin American exports from
gaining access to desired markets. Although substantial progress has been
made in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina with exports of manufactured and
semi-manufactured goods, Latin America still finds itself generally on the
periphery of the patterns of commerce. It remains considerably depen-
dent upon industrialized countries (the United States in particular).
In addition, a new and very serious problem has developed. There
has been a tremendous increase in foreign debt, held mostly by private
foreign banks on shorter, more expensive terms. This has led to a call for
debt rescheduling to ease the burden of "bunches" of debt service falling
due between 1978 and 1982."
Liquidity crises occur when a country's external debt situation worsens
as a result of external factors or domestic policy failures or a combina-
tion of both, which can then lead to reactions that compound the prob-
terim Assessment, 14 BANK OF LONDON & S. Am. REV. 160 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
BOLSA REv.].
4 See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1979.
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lem and engender the need for debt reorganizations and painful adjust-
ments in domestic economic policies. 5
Contributing factors include fluctuations in prices or volume of com-
modity exports; increased barriers to export markets due to protection-
ism; sharp increases in foreign currency expenditures due to unusually
high oil import prices; large quantities of food imports to fill shortfalls
caused by ISI-neglected agricultural sectors; large infrastructure projects
(e.g., the Brazilian nuclear program), military hardware expenditures (as
in Peru under Velasco) or "showcase" projects designed more for political
rather than economic or social gain. Another significant cause of liquidity
crises or debt mismanagement is excessive recourse to short-term foreign
borrowing to finance medium or long-term development projects (e.g., in
Venezuela under Carlos-Andres Perez).
During the last half of the 1970's, ISI was attacked for ignoring the
development of the agricultural sector as the source of food for the ex-
panding populations of these countries, as employer for the increasing
number of laborers, and as a 'potential for increased agricultural exports.
ISI was also criticized because it fostered protectionism. Since the domes-
tic markets in many cases were too small to promote efficient production,
barriers were erected to keep out import competition. The aggressive new
development philosophy that was consolidated and emerged in the 1970's
is based on interdependence and collective self-reliance, among other ma-
jor principles. It is clear that the promotion of exports, manufactured and
agricultural, has been elevated to the highest priority. This means a re-
newed effort to increase efficiency and productivity in the agricultural
sector and, where the comparative advantage exists, the development and
improvement of processing industries which add value to primary com-
modities (including natural resources) and thus give the host country a
"bigger slice of the pie."
An international agreement has now been reached under UNCTAD
auspices to. create a "Common Fund" which will aid in stabilizing primary
commodity prices and reduce the adverse effects on producing countries
in the event of severe fluctuations." It is also hoped that this agreement
will facilitate the conclusion of additional international commodity agree-
ments between producing and consuming countries, like those already in
existence for tin and coffee.
Recent circumstances have dictated that the energy issue be given
highest priority. On the supply side, exploration and drilling for new oil
85 Id. at 30.
6 Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities adopted by the United
Nations Negotiating Conference on a Common Fund Under the Integrated Programme for
Commodities, June 27, 1980. For a summary, see Common Fund Conference Adopts Arti-
cles of Agreement, U.N. Press Release, TAD/994, June 30, 1980.
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and gas will receive full political support, and the terms of risk contracts
and other promotion laws have been and will continue to be modified to
offer the necessary incentive to attract capital and technology from in-
ternational firms. But beyond the search for more hydrocarbons is the
additional goal of diversifying energy sources. Renewed emphasis on hy-
droelectric power has appeared, as well as a return to the use of and ex-
ploration for coal, and the development of nuclear power. There has also
been scattered emphasis on alcohol as a fuel for automobiles, and thermal
and solar energy, where comparative advantage exists. On the demand
side, conservation of gasoline, adjustment of local fuel prices and other
measures are expected.
In the last half of the 1970's, population growth rates were effectively
arrested in the hemisphere and, in some cases, even reduced (e.g., Brazil,
Mexico and Colombia, the three largest in population). Projections for
the end of the century have been reduced from earlier astronomical
levels. Nevertheless, high growth rates in the 1950's, and 1960's and
1970's provided impetus for the-development of another objective that
has been elevated to the highest level: the absorption of massive numbers
of new workers into the labor force annually. According to recent esti-
mates, Brazil and Mexico alone have had to absorb 2 million new workers
annually into the labor force. This also clearly signifies the need for pro-
ductivity increases to serve these growing populations.
V. PROGNOSIS
These forecasts should not be viewed as precise but rather as general
probabilities. Development strategies in Latin American countries will
vary due to differing impacts of growth rates in the United States and
other industrialized countries, world energy supplies and prices, interna-
tional inflation, trade flows and other factors. Therefore, the associated
laws and corresponding regulations will vary in order to compensate for
external and internal pressures. For similar reasons, the forecasts should
be interpreted within the context of each particular industry. Despite
these qualifications, forecasting new policy priorities based on these de-
velopment strategy reappraisals is useful because it may facilitate the
planning that U.S. practitioners and their clients must undertake in order
to conduct business in Latin America in the 1980's.
A. State Role in Industry
There has been very little evidence to convince the planners that in-
tervention by the State in some forms was not justified. Although various
political movements intervened excessively by nationalizing various in-
dustries (some of which have been subsequently sold back or placed on
the block for "reprivatization"), and the creation of State enterprises to
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run petroleum, mining or other basic industries in some countries has re-
sulted in inefficiency and corruption, this trend is not likely to be re-
versed or eliminated. A need still exists for planning, for control of basic
industries, for massive improvements in the agricultural sector (including
selective land reform to improve productivity and utilize land still lying
idle), and for massive efforts to devise comprehensive energy plans which
simultaneously emphasize conservation, new exploration and drilling, and
developing alternate sources of energy. The political expectations created
by the past generation simply will not permit a return to a "free market"
where fate is determined by the private sector. But greater selectivity will
be exercised in the 1980's, and there will be some shifting from foreign
investment control to investment promotion. Signs of this are already evi-
dent in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Argentina. Brazil will be seriously
constricted until later in the decade by its balance of payments difficulty,
and Mexico will apply its own unique formula for investment promotion.
B. Increased Competition
Free-market economics were introduced toward the end of the 1970's
on a large scale in Chile and Argentina, and on a smaller scale in some of
the other countries. The objective was to make domestic producers more
efficient by increasing foreign competition. One result was the displace-
ment of some of the inefficient producers into other sectors where more
opportunity existed. The intended result was also achieved, as domestic
producers modernized facilities and increased productivity. Unique appli-
cations of similar free-market theories have been applied more recently in
at least Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Colombia and, later Venezuela. While pro-
tectionism will not disappear in the coming decade (indeed, protectionism
in the United States and its effect on Latin American imports is a grow-
ing concern), those supporters of the market mechanism have clearly
gained points in the internal debates throughout the hemisphere. Private
enterprise, both national and transnational, will have a fresh opportunity
in the 1980's to demonstrate its effectiveness as a true partner in
development.
C. Capital Markets
Although growth for its own sake is no longer in vogue, capital for-
mation remains at the heart of the process of investment, development,
and growth. Strengthening capital markets has been the solution adopted
to increase capital formation. But the desired plan for economic develop-
ment must now be compatible with a more equitable distribution of social
benefits. A method for achieving this goal has not yet been devised, but
governments across the hemisphere are sensitive to this need. In the fu-
ture, many investment applications will be carefully reviewed and ap-
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provals doggedly negotiated to evaluate whether the net social contribu-
tion of these investments is positive or negative. Moreover, substantial
energy has been directed toward strengthening and improving mecha-
nisms which encourage greater domestic savings in Venezuela, Colombia,
Mexico and Brazil, as well as other countries.8 7 Attempts to provide for
greater stability and broader participation in the capital formation proc-
ess will continue to be made through building new institutions and im-
proving those already existing.
D. Deconcentration of Industry
Deconcentration tries to direct industries away from the highly con-
gested urban industrial zones, where rural migration has made it impossi-
ble for municipal governments to provide overly congested areas with ad-
equate facilities and services. Brazil is well known as the leader in
attempting to open up new regions to industry. Brazil's Superintendency
for Development of the Northeast Region (SUDENE)" and Superinten-
dency for the Development of the Amazon Region (SUDAM) 89 offers pro-
grams with substantial incentives for companies willing to locate their
plants in the northeast or the Amazon Basin. The Argentine Industrial
Promotion Law of 1977,9 the Colombian Development Plan issued in
1980,91 the Venezuelan VI National Development Plan (1981)" and
others are expected to increase the effort to deconcentrate industry in the
major cities. The 1979 National Industrial Development Plan of Mexico"s
67 See generally Wiles, The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law, 8 INT'L LAW. 303 (1974);
Johnson, An Analysis of the Venezuela Securities Legislation, 12 INT'L LAW. Part I, 171
Part II, 241 (1978); Anyone for the Bolsa? 125 FoRmss 11, at 53-54 (1980).
" Superintendency for Development of the Northeast Region, (SUDENE), Created by
Law No. 3.692 of Dec. 15, 1959, [1959] 23 Coletanea 567 (Braz.), reprinted in BANCO DO
BRAZIL, SUMMARY OF THE INVESTMENT LEGISLATION IN BRAZIL 5-8 (Int'l Div. 1979).
" Superintendency for Development of the Amazon Region (SUDAM), created by Law
No. 5.173 of Oct. 27, 1966, [1966] 7 Colei&o 322 (Braz.), reprinted in BANCO DO BRAZIL, Id.
at 9-12.
" Law No. 21.608 of July 23, 1977; and Decree 2541 of Aug. 26, 1977, [1977] B.O.,
(Arg.) reprinted in 49 BOLETIN DE INFORMACI6N LEGAL 1-3 (1977).
91 Colombian National Development Plan (Plan de Integraci6n Nacional), 1979-1982,
Departmento Nacional de Planeacion Rep~blica de Colombia, BIBLIOr-CA DEL DESARROLLO-
DNP (1st ed. 1980).
" The first draft of this Plan was originally presented by CORDIPLAN, the Venezue-
lan Central Office of Coordination and Development, on September 30, 1980. It has subse-
quently been revised several times. Due to the fact that 95% of Venezuela's exports are oil
related and the price of oil has been reduced in 1981 due to market fluctuations, the Plan is
again being drastically revised. Thus, no official citation for the final version is available at
this writing.
" The Mexican Plan was established by a series of four Federal Executive Decrees, see
Decree [1979] D.O., Feb. 2, 1979 (which establishes geographical zones for the execution of
the Program of Incentives for the Territorial Deconcentration of Industrial Activities); De-
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is the most well-coordinated attempt that country has ever made to pro-
mote industry. While very few new deconcentration plans offer the infra-
structural advantages of the Mexican Plan, they will attempt to address a
problem given higher priority than in the past.
E. Regional Energy Cooperation
Mexico's President, Jos6 L6pez Portillo, and Venezuelan Energy
Minister, Humberto Calder6n Berti, as well as officials of the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank, have been promulgating suggestions for various
forms of increased cooperation to help solve the energy problem within
the hemisphere. Mexico has called for assistance by petroleum exporters
to those oil-importing less developed countries (LDCs).9 The Venezuelan
plans went considerably farther in proposing a regional or hemispheric
energy cooperation system.95 The Inter-American Development Bank has
called for a fund to support some of these activities. This attractive idea
should gain support in the early part of this decade as inherent problems
are identified and solutions are proposed. The joint hydroelectric projects
of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay may produce a regional power grid for
the Southern Cone countries. A proposal for a Central American grid has
been on the table for some time, but it has been delayed by political in-
stability in that region. These grids and other interconnections will stabi-
lize power usage in the various regions. Finally, the 1980's will see in-
creased use of non-oil sources of energy, including hydroelectric, coal,
natural gas, nuclear, alcohol and others.
F. Environmental Concerns
Industry has concentrated heavily in Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Buenos
Aires and several other cities throughout the region. The population of
ten cities in Brazil now exceeds one million. As a result, environmental
concerns have increased during the 1970's. Most countries now have a
national environmental commission looking into the establishment of
standards and regulations. These commissions will face new problems in
cree, [1979] D.O., Mar. 6, 1979 (which establishes Fiscal Incentives for the Development of
Employment and Investment in Industrial Activities); Decree [1979] D.O., Mar. 9, 1979
(which establishes the Fiscal Incentives for the Development of Employment and Invest-
ment in Industrial Activities); Decree [1979] D.O., Mar. 19, 1979 (which orders the execu-
tion of the National Plan of Industrial Development and establishes the bases for its fulfill-
ment). See also Radway supra note 63, 371-72.
", Address by President Jos6 L6pez Portillo at the 34th Session of the U.N. General
Assembly, New York, Sept. 27, 1979.
" Speech by the Hon. Humberto Calder6n Berti, Minister of Energy and Mines, Re-
public of Venezuela, at a meeting of the Venezuelan-American Association in New York,
Mar. 4, 1980.
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the coming decade. For example, considerable attention must be directed
at avoiding environmental damage on areas previously untouched by in-
dustrial activity but now affected by deconcentration plans. Pipelines and
alternate energy development, particularly nuclear, will also produce fur-
ther concerns for the environment.
G. Agriculture
New and creative approaches to spur productivity in the agricultural
sector will be developed and implemented. Post-harvest storage, trans-
portation and credit facilities will be increased, along with the traditional
brick and mortar (e.g., access roads). Solar energy has already been har-
nessed for drying purposes to protect grain against spoilage during ship-
ment. Food processing industries are being encouraged to create more ec-
onomic value, improve revenues, and utilize existing options for access to
foreign markets. Emphasis on improving the diets of disadvantaged seg-
ments of the population has emerged in programs in Colombia," Mex-
ico,'" and the Andean group."
H. Consumer Protection
Interest has been developing in Latin America recently for greater
consumer protection. This will manifest itself in a variety of ways. Price
controls, are familiar throughout Latin America (notwithstanding that
this impedes the free functioning of the market). Truer advertising rules
and practices are being enforced" to reduce deceptive and unfair prac-
tices in response to the growing middle class in several countries whose
consumption patterns increasingly emulate those in North America and
Europe. Experimentation with product liability laws is to be expected,
following their successful introduction in Europe.
I. New Linkage
One of the vital elements in the new approach to development in
" Colombian Plan Nacional de Alimentaci6n y Nutrici6n, adopted Mar. 1975, as part
of an overall social, economic and regional development program by the government of Dr.
Lopez Michelson.
97 Office of Advisors to the President, Mexican Food Plan, First Proposal of Goals for
the Consumption and Production of Basic Foods, for 1980-1982, [19801 D.O., Mar. 1, 1980
(Mex.).
" Los Proyectos Andinos de Desarrollo Tecnol6gico en el Area de Alimentos, approved
Feb. 24, 1978. The Inter-American Development Bank conducted a symposium later in 1978
entitled Nutrition and Socioeconomic Development of Latin America. See 7 IDB NEWS 4
(1980).
" See e.g. Mexican Government Issues Tougher Rules for Marketing Promotions, Bus.
LATIN Am. May 28, 1980 at 171-73.
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Latin America and throughout the Third World is the creation of new
"linkages." The recent thaw in relations and signing of new agreements
between Argentina and Brazil have extremely significant implications.
These two countries have each included in their planning for the last 40
years the premise of a war with the other. Resources were dedicated and
reserved for this premise. Territories of each country were effectively left
as "buffer zones" and only minor attempts were made to develop these
areas. Hemispheric and national security possibilities improve with this
recent development.100 In 1980 Argentina agreed to ship hundreds of
thousands of tons of grains to Mexico. While this does not represent a
major percentage of Mexico's food imports, it is only one link in an ex-
panding network of cooperation between those two countries.
In 1979, a U.N. conference was held in Arusha, Tanzania concerning
"Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries." The premise of
this conference, now widely accepted and incorporated in current devel-
opment thinking, is the "collective self-reliance" or "interdependence"
(South-South)01 approach to development. As the Latin American coun-
tries begin to develop and improve regional trade patterns and other eco-
nomic linkages, the prospects for economic integration and more effective
development improve by a significant factor. Since 1979, Brazil has been
trading with other developing countries to a greater extent than it has
with the United States. 1" Spain and Portugal, with traditional ties to
Latin America, may become the bridge for increased activity between
Latin America and the European Economic Community (EEC). The An-
dean Pact's initiative in 1980 in using Spain as an intermediary in negoti-
ations with the EEC to obtain Lom6 group status exemplifies this
change.103 Japan's role throughout the hemisphere has increased mul-
tidimensionally and Korea is gaining an increased presence, especially in
the Caribbean. It is anticipated that, during the 1980's, the ASEAN
group " 4 will begin to build more bridges with Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Mexico. Thus, economic integration in the 1980's is likely to be of a
different and more pragmatic nature. Far less dependence on the political
vicissitudes of the United States can be expected and far more on these
100 See Hayes, Security to the South: U.S. Interests in Latin America, 5 INT'L SECUR-
ITY 130 (1980).
11 To lessen dependence on the industrialized countries, developing countries are en-
couraged to expand trade and technology exchanges among themselves. Since most of the
developing countries are situated south of the Equator, this is referred to as "South-South"
in contrast to "East-West" or "North-South."
1o See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 84, at 27.
103 See Spain and Latin America: Trade, Financing and Investment, 14 BOLSA REv.
169 (1980).
1" The ASEAN group consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and
Singapore.
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expanding linkages and the return to bilateralism within LAIA. In addi-
tion the role of the United States in trade, investment and finance in
Latin America has diminished in relation to total statistics in each
category.
J. Corruption in Governments
Ever since passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977,105
U.S. practitioners have been troubled with "due diligence" inquiries on
behalf of their clients with respect to operations in certain Latin Ameri-
can countries. While the promise of significant improvements in this deli-
cate area would be reassuring, it is unlikely that such will be seen in the
early part of this decade. Not immediately, however, but bearing some
relationship to slight increases in competition, greater emphasis on pro-
ductivity, consumer protection and self-reliance concepts, this commenta-
tor believes that selected countries (Mexico, in particular) will lead in the
attempts to reduce the amount of corruption and inefficiency in their re-
spective governments. It will take longer for countries like Paraguay,
Venezuela and others with their particular histories, but it is believed
that this movement will be augmented by a United Nations conference to
be called on this subject during the next decade.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Practitioners will be able to draw inferences from the aforementioned
observations that certain types of laws, regulations, and other control
mechanisms will emerge during the 1980's as factors to be considered in
their clients' business planning. Increased competition will mean enforce-
ment of existing but heretofore dormant anti-monopoly laws. This result
has been seen in Chile toward the end of the 1970's. Argentina has re-
cently enacted a new antitrust law.1" It can be expected elsewhere.
Deconcentration of industry should lead to interesting laws in vari-
ous states, provinces, and even in municipalities which seek to derive rev-
enues and other benefits from regulation of industry now moving into
their territories. The question of conflict with or preemption by federal
laws is a new one and will most likely emerge in the hemisphere during
the next decade.
Consumer protection laws, such as product liability and "truth in ad-
vertising," are expected as well. Greater regulation of securities and capi-
tal markets in general is on the horizon. These regulations will be
designed to attract institutional participation and fresh money, to pre-
105 The Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213 (1977), 92 Stat. 1494.
10 Argentine Decree No. 22.262 of Aug. 5, 1980, [1980] B.O., (Arg.). This law became
effective on Dec. 1, 1980.
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vent abuses, and to increase disclosure for the benefit of potential inves-
tors along the lines of securities laws in the United States. Bilateral
double-taxation treaties will be negotiated and possibly executed in this
decade. Given the history of the last three decades, it is possible that we
will see new and ingenious attempts at regulation of multinational enter-
prises since the grudging acceptance of these firms' importance in devel-
opment and integration will not remove the desirability of using them as
the target which they have so conveniently provided during the last
couple of decades.
This summary should also be helpful in understanding why certain
Latin American countries have been actively leading Third World efforts
to seek solutions to problems of trade. These efforts are directed at the
stabilization of commodity prices and the increased access to markets of
industrialized countries. The Third World is also seeking solutions to the
problems of energy, technology transfer, and financing of development
(including debt rescheduling) which taken together, represent the five is-
sues on the agenda for the proposed Global Negotiations,1" was sched-
uled to be discussed at the Cancun (Mexico) meeting in October of 1981
under the co-sponsorship of Austria and Mexico.
107 United Nations General Assembly, Global Negotiations Relating to International
Economic Cooperation for Development, U.N. GAOR Res. 34/138 (1979).
1981

